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Abstract
1
In Brazil, there exists a two-tiered system of healthcare access. Those with sufficient means have
access to a private system of healthcare that provides quality treatment on demand, while the
remainder of the country relies on an overburdened system of public clinics and hospitals. 
Household survey data are used to determine which socio-demographic groups rely most on this
public healthcare system.  Current demographic trends suggest that the public healthcare
infrastructure will become more and more heavily used in the coming decades.  A stylized model
of healthcare choice is estimated, and its parameters are used to conduct counterfactual simulations
of the welfare implications of this increased congestion, and of policies to offset it, like private
healthcare subsidies.
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1. Introduction
In Brazil there exists a two-tiered system of healthcare.  Those with sufficient means, or whose
employers provide health coverage, have access to a private system of healthcare that provides
quality treatment on demand.  The rest of the population relies on a system of public clinics and
hospitals.  As is the case with most public healthcare systems around the world, the Brazilian system
is characterized by long waiting times and questionable quality, with the practical implication that
those who are forced to rely on the system spend more time being sick and, subsequently, have a
diminished health stock.
This two-tiered system of healthcare is a particularly relevant concern in Brazil in light of
recent changes in the country￿s socio-demographic structure.  In 1990, only 6.7 percent of Brazil￿s
population was over age 60, but by 2010 this is expected to be 9.7 percent and by 2030, 16.9 percent
(World Bank, 1994 and 2000).  During the last twenty years, family sizes among the poorer segments
of Brazilian society (i.e., those who typically rely most on the public provision of healthcare), have
been larger than in wealthier segments of society.  This large population group has been aging, and
it is nearing a time when its healthcare needs will grow rapidly (Cutler and Meara, 1998).  Concerns
have been raised that the Brazilian public health system will not be up to meeting this growing
demand.  In particular, already-long waiting times for treatment will continue to grow, with the
practical implication that many of the poorest segments of society will receive no healthcare at all.
This mechanism of social exclusion of the poor, elderly, and rural population will increase at the rate
at which this segment of the Brazilian population is growing.
This mechanism may have long-run feedback effects as well. Growing demand due to the
increasing size of the poor, elderly population, as well as the increasing cost of treatment for a
limited supply of public health services, will mean that the poorest segments of Brazilian society will
begin to lose access to healthcare.  This will result in a declining health stock for the poor,
reinforcing their socio-economic position.  To the extent that the poor continue to have larger
families (e.g., as a retirement-insurance mechanism or a source of labor for subsistence agriculture),
this will lead to further strains on the public healthcare system in the future and the likelihood of
further failures.6
This paper seeks to accomplish three tasks. First, an outstanding set of Brazilian household
survey data will be used to characterize which social groups have access to private healthcare.  These
data include the 1998 PNAD, a broad household survey that provides detailed information on health,
healthcare consumption, and, most importantly, the source from which one receives health services.
On the basis of these data, it can be argued that certain groups are systematically denied access to
private healthcare in an indirect fashion.  After identifying which groups are subject to this form of
exclusion, the second part of the study will construct and empirically identify a stylized model of
choice between alternative sources of healthcare provision, from which it will be possible to derive
a crude measure of the welfare consequences of the increased healthcare congestion costs that are
likely to accompany the demographic transition currently observed in Brazil. With these welfare
conclusions, the final part this study will analyze the implications of policy alternatives such as
private healthcare subsidies.
Section 2 of this paper describes the healthcare system in Brazil. Section 3 describes the
household survey data used in the analysis.  Section 4 outlines the methodological approach for
demonstrating that indirect exclusion exists and measuring its consequences, reporting how the
implicit ￿price￿ of public healthcare varies across socio-demographic groups in Brazil. Section 5
carries out two counterfactual simulations.  The first examines the impacts of an increase in the
implicit price of public healthcare, such as that which would arise from the increased congestion that
would accompany the predicted increases in healthcare demand in Brazil.
2 The second simulation
considers the impact of a private healthcare subsidy being provided by the government, making that
option more accessible to groups who had previously been able to afford only public healthcare.
Given the propensity of individuals to switch their source of healthcare provision, such a policy
might only result in rent transfers to those segments of society that would not be considered
￿excluded.￿  Section 6 concludes by suggesting limitations to, and possible extensions of, this
research.
                                                
2 It is important to note that these simulations could just as well describe any change in the public provision of healthcare
in Brazil that (i) increased the implicit price of obtaining services, or (ii) reduced the quality of services received, relative
to private healthcare.  Available data do not permit a distinction between price and quality of healthcare received.
Instead, it is necessary to speak in terms of the implicit price of ￿effective￿ units of healthcare.  Higher quality healthcare
allows one to receive ￿effective￿ units at a lower price in this analysis (i.e., it requires fewer trips to the doctor to get a
fixed quantity of services), just as would a discount provider of low-quality healthcare.  More will be said about this later7
2. The Brazilian Healthcare System
The healthcare system in Brazil is rooted in a belief that individuals and households should, at the
most basic level, be protected by the public sector.  Therefore, while many Brazilian citizens rely on
private sources of healthcare provision, the system also includes a very large public component,
which is intended to act as a ￿safety net.￿  The public system, which has its own hospital facilities
and is federally financed by the SUS (Sistema ￿nico de Saude, or Unified Health System in English),
is intended to provide resources to meet the healthcare demands of those parts of the Brazilian
population that do not have private insurance to cover medical expenses.  The need for such a system
in Brazil is very real.  Public health figures show the persistence of endemic diseases, leading to an
annual mortality rate is 0.6 percent (i.e., approximately 1 million people).  The UN estimates that
the Unified Health System provided for 12.6 million hospitalizations in about 2,000 public and
private hospitals in 1995, and 1.2 billion consultations in out-patient clinics.  Similarly, there are
some 507,000 hospital beds in Brazil (about 1 per 300 members of the population), of which about
one third are in public establishments.  Alves, Carvalheiro and Heimann (2000) show that, in the
state of Sªo Paulo, 48.9 percent of the health services used in 1998 were paid by the SUS, 6 percent
were paid directly by the users and 45.1 percent of the health services were pre-paid.
3  Among the
total population of the state of Sªo Paulo, 44.2 percent have some type of health insurance coverage,
while 55.8 percent have none. Those without health insurance coverage have to rely entirely on the
SUS.  Alves (2000) shows that for the city of Sªo Paulo, located in the more developed southern area
of Brazil, close to 40 percent of the population is cared for by the public healthcare system.   In the
rest of Brazil, over 50 percent of the population relies on this public health system.
In terms of its structure, the SUS is a decentralized system that provides healthcare by
districts down to the municipal level.  The Municipal Health Secretary has jurisdiction over SUS
health centers, hospitals, labs and services, and administers funds provided by the federal, state and
municipal governments.  A Municipal Health Council consists of organization members, citizens
and school personnel, and it approves health programs; establishment of this type of council is
necessary for the municipality to receive federal funds.  Districts and municipalities can cooperate
                                                                                                                                                            
in the paper.
3In Brazil the main pre-paid health care services are group-medicine plans, medical cooperatives, or corporate plans. All8
in sharing expenses and resources with the aim of enhancing healthcare efficiency.
The history of the SUS goes back more than a decade, to the Brazilian constitution of 1988,
which mandated a free, universal health care system as a result of a long social movement to counter
the inequitable health policies of previous regimes. Previous military regimes in Brazil had left a
healthcare system that was highly centralized and with little capacity￿in effect, a system that was
extremely unresponsive to Brazil￿s local needs and regional diversity.  In the 1970s, inflation was
rampant and the Brazilian economy was in crisis.  A severe recession followed in the early 1980s
and public healthcare expenditures fell substantially, driving down the quality of both health services
and infrastructure.  In response to this, a council consisting of federal ministry representatives
undertook the Reforma Sanitaria, a health care reform effort.  The first phase of this reform was the
Integrated Health Actions, an effort to improve coordination and decentralize service delivery from
the Ministry of Health and INAMPS (Instituto Nacional de Assistencia), the main financing
mechanism, to state and municipal levels.  The second phase of the reform was the creation of the
SUDS (Sistemas Unificados e Decentralizados de Saude) in 1987-88, which completed the process
of decentralization.  Then came along the new constitution in 1988, which paved the way for the
creation of SUS, the third and final phase of the reform.  Since that time, the SUS has begun to
contract-out a large majority of patient care to a network of private and philanthropic hospitals,
clinics, and other facilities.    Alves, Carvalheiro, Heimann (2000) estimate that 20 percent of the
available hospital beds in Brazil used by the SUS in 1998 belonged to private hospitals.  The
government itself owns just 31 percent of the hospital beds it supports and has been gradually
decentralizing the control of publicly owned facilities.  This trend towards decentralization and
privatization in Brazilian healthcare reform will be important to the policy conclusions in Section
5.
Private healthcare in Brazil has grown rapidly, with about 26 percent of Brazilians covered
by such plans.  The plans vary a great deal in terms of price and quality but usually exclude
expensive, catastrophic conditions, leaving them to be covered by the public system.  The private
plans are also subject to virtually no regulation.  Attributes of the available private plans are
described in Section 3.
                                                                                                                                                            
of them offer pre-paid services for individuals, family and other entities such as firms and unions.9
While the state is theoretically responsible for healthcare in Brazil, state expenditures on
healthcare represent only about 4.2 percent of GNP each year, a low figure relative to some of
Brazil￿s neighbors and countries like India.  In comparison, the US allocates about 12.7 percent of
its GNP to health care, France about 9 percent, El Salvador about 6 percent, and Paraguay 3 percent.
 This low level of spending has led to many questions about the quality of publicly provided
healthcare in Brazil.  Less than $80 per capita was spent on healthcare in Brazil last year, whereas
the corresponding per capita expenditure in Argentina was more on the order of $300 and in the US,
$2,300.  Almost $16 billion was spent on health care in 1995, of which $2.7 billion was used to pay
staff and $2.9 billion was used to cover old loans. 
Alvarez (1998) states, ￿the private sector in Brazil currently does a reasonably good job of
providing for the 25% of the population that its plans and services reach.  However, the public sector
SUS is doing a poor job of servicing the other 75%.￿  Numerous anecdotes and some empirical
evidence illustrate just how ineffective the SUS may be.  For example, the world record for
hospitalizations occurred in Campo Grande do Sul in the State of Parana in Brazil, where over 60
percent of the population was hospitalized in one year.  An audit of the system then revealed that
about 24.1 percent of all diagnoses were false.  The detailed household survey data in the 1998
PNAD, which are described in the following section, makes it possible to look specifically at
individual perceptions of healthcare quality.  In particular, the PNAD questions individuals as to
whether they sought healthcare during the previous two weeks, and if so, were they able to receive
it.  If they were unable to receive healthcare, questions determine whether it was, among other
causes, because doctors were not present at the healthcare facility or equipment was malfunctioning.
Table 1 divides the sample of heads-of-households in the PNAD into those who use the private
healthcare system, and those who rely on the public system, and examine their answers to each of
these questions. The results indicate a clear-cut superiority of the private health system over the SUS
system.  For the country as a whole, the private system exhibited lower waiting times than did the
public system. The responses ￿No Vacancy￿ (in the case of hospitals) and ￿No Attending Doctors￿
have higher rates for the public system. The remaining attributes of the quality of the health systems,
as perceived by patients, are similarly unfavorable towards the SUS. At the regional level the picture
is similar, although less reliable due to the smaller number of observations.10
A World Health Organization (WHO) Report released in June of 2001 placed Brazil 125
th
out of 191 countries in the world and claimed that its health situation is comparable to that in
countries like Nepal, Cambodia, and Vietnam.  Brazil￿s low ranking is mostly attributed to the
inequitable manner in which the healthcare system is financed; the WHO generally concludes that
Brazilians have to pay too much for healthcare, and that the poor suffer the most under the Brazilian
system.  There are huge income disparities in Brazil: 35 million of the 120 million Brazilians without
private health insurance are below the poverty line.
According to the World Bank Operations Evaluation Department (1998), Brazil￿s health
system might appear to be efficient (it substantially separates financing from the provision of
services), but it is inching toward crisis. The public system is underfinanced and therefore exhibits
severe regional inequalities, rationing, and declining quality.  The World Bank Report goes further:
 ...the hyperinflation of the late 1980s and early 1990s and the irregular flow of
resources to health have contributed to the evolution of a fee structure for medical
treatment that has not kept pace with costs, and payment can be sporadic. Doctors
frequently must work at several sites to make ends meet. Stories of long lines for
hospital services, mistakes in emergency care, strikes and walkouts by medical
professionals, arbitrary triage, and other crises are reported daily in the press.
This system covers about 70 percent of inpatient and outpatient care.  However, local
governments are given responsibilities under the decentralization of the public health care system,
but do not necessarily have the resources or incentives to deliver cost-effective services. 
Expenditures do not target the poor, and institutions are extremely fragmented and expensive.  Brazil
has one of the lowest ratios of nurses to doctors in the developing world (0.33:1 in 1996) and an
average of only 13 doctors per 10,000 residents.  Moreover, the SUS has also brought with it a
decrease in physicians￿ pay.  According to the National School of Public Health at Brazil￿s Oswaldo
Cruz Foundation, a doctor of the old National Institute would have received a much higher salary
there than he can now, even though he still performs the same functions and maintains the same
caseload and hours.11
In summary, in Brazil and in most Latin American countries,
4 the public sector still has a
major responsibility for the provision of health services.  The Brazilian government uses general
revenues to pay for the healthcare of middle- and low-income population groups, while upper income
groups tend to use their own resources to pay for private healthcare.  Those with low income and
education, as well as members of certain racial groups, tend to be discriminated against by the system
in the sense that, for public health care, access is more difficult, waiting times on lines are longer,
as are travel distances, yet these groups do not have the financial resources to take part in the private
system without inordinate sacrifices of other consumption.  Given this two-tiered system of service
provision, healthcare utilization would be expected to exhibit large variance across the population,
and this is supported by the literature indicating that utilization of health services differs vastly by
income groups in Brazil (Alves, 2000). 
3. Data
The 1998 PNAD is an annual household survey on socio-economic conditions of the Brazilian
population, collected under the responsibility of the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estastistica
(IBGE).  The 1998 PNAD has a special supplement dealing with the health conditions of the
Brazilian population, making it particularly suitable for this analysis.  The survey covers 344,975
individuals and 98,166 households.  In the present analysis, however, the number of observations
is smaller due to missing values for some important variables, particularly income per person in the
household.  The use of this survey data presents a number of advantages.  First, it is one of the only
surveys to collect data on health of the population in a consistent fashion.  Second, data collection
on health is accompanied by a full set of socio-economic data on the individual and the household.
 Use of the PNAD also presents some disadvantages.  The collection of such data relies on the
training of data enumerators to record health status. Thus, when looking at reported illnesses, the
accuracy might not be as high as it would be if medical professionals were examining the individuals
and reporting their illnesses.  In addition, data in the Northern region of Brazil are restricted to the
urban sector and are, therefore, not representative of the entire region.  The full data set, however,
does cover thoroughly the remaining regions of Brazil, and the exclusion of the rural North does not
                                                
4 See Parker and Wong (1997) and Wong (2000) for an analysis of the Mexican health system.12
harm the survey￿s representativeness, since this population is very scarce.  The present analysis uses
the household data set instead of the larger individual sample data.  Decisions on healthcare
utilization are major decisions made at the level of the household, and using individual data would
likely introduce correlations between household members.
Table 2 shows some major characteristics of the data set.  The variable With_HP measures
the proportion of household heads who have a private health insurance plan paid either by himself
or by his employer.  This amounts to 17 percent of total household heads.  The remaining households
use the public health system. The variable PrivHP indicates whether a household pays for its own
health plan, and Whopay indicates that a household has a private plan that is paid for by an employer.
The average household income in the sample is R$ 962.50 monthly.  The average payment of health
insurance for the 6.9 percent who pay their own medical insurance is R$ 150.31 and their average
household income is higher than the sample average, at R$ 2,137.50 and R$ 781.19 of household
per capita income (income reported in Table 2 is the average household per capita income).  The
average per capita income for the households paying for a private health plan is twice the average
per capita income of the household sample.
The mean of the Metro variable gives the proportion of the household heads living in
Brazilian metropolitan areas.  Age60 is a variable that specifies whether the head of the household
is over 60 years of age, while Child_14 indicates the proportion of persons, below age 14, living in
the household. The set of race-differentiation variables are White, Mixed, Black and Asian. The
proportion of Blacks is quite small, although it should be noted that a large portion of the people who
include themselves in the Mixed racial would generally be perceived as Black.  The proportion of
households not reporting illness is 49.1 percent. The remaining 50.9 percent reported the occurrence
of at least one illness, and the proportion of people seeking medical treatment in the last two weeks
is 13.1 percent. Table 1 reports the results of users￿ evaluations of the quality of the healthcare
sought by those households.  Illnesses are self-reported by the head of the household.
The characteristics of the private health insurance plans are presented at the bottom of Table
2.  The health plan attributes are defined by a set of dummy variables.  The variable plcons takes a
value of 1 when the health plan allows for the prior appointment of a doctor consultation and zero
otherwise.  Table 2 shows that 98.04 percent of the health insurance plans cover pre-appointment13
for visits to doctors.  Pllist is 1 when the health insurance policy presents a list of authorized doctors,
hospitals and laboratories that can be used by the policyholder and 0 otherwise; 92.47 percent of the
private health insurance policies present a list of authorized doctors, hospitals and laboratories.  The
value for the variable plreemb indicates that 30.99 percent of the health plans permit reimbursement
of medical expenses when the individual is attended by doctors or health centers not affiliated with
the health plan.  Plother indicates that 81.15 percent of policyholders can be attended by doctors,
hospitals and laboratories in cities other than the one in which they reside, and pldent indicates that
only 21.94 percent of health insurance plans cover dental treatment. This attribute is clearly not a
widespread characteristic of private health insurance, and plans with this attribute are more
expensive than those without. Paymore is a variable capturing the fact that some health insurance
policies impose a ceiling on what they pay for healthcare expenses, and any expense above this limit
has to be paid by the policyholder.
5  The variable plexam indicates that 95.60 percent of health plans
allow the policyholder to take complementary lab exams during treatment. Among private
policyholders, 92.83 percent are covered for hospitalization, as indicated by the variable plinter.
Platend indicates that 80.54 percent of policyholders are attended by medical services under contract
with their heath insurance company.  Very few health plans cover the acquisition of medicines and
drugs.  Plmedic indicates that this attribute is very special and covers only 4.85 percent of the private
health insurance holders.  Among health insurance holders, only 3.07 percent of plans cover
orthodontal  treatment.  This aspect of the health insurance is represented by the variable odonto.
This detailed list of private health plan attributes will prove valuable in the following
analysis in that it makes it possible to impute prices for a ￿standardized￿ private health plan (i.e., a
simplified plan without any of the ￿bells and whistles￿ described above) for every member of the
sample, regardless of whether they actually bought a private health plan (of any type).  Calculation
of these imputed prices will be necessary for determining the welfare consequences for each
individual of facing an increase in the shadow price of public healthcare.
                                                
5 This is the only attribute among the eleven described here for which the dummy variable assumes the value of one when
it indicates a detrimental characteristic of the health plan.14
4. Research Methodology
In order to characterize indirect exclusion from private healthcare in Brazil, a two-pronged
methodological approach is adopted.  First, the detailed survey information in the 1998 PNAD data
set, described in Section 3, is employed to determine generally which groups in Brazilian society
have access to private health insurance and which rely on public healthcare.  Being relegated to
public healthcare is not a direct form of exclusion, but rather one based on relative prices for private
and public healthcare that may be different for individuals from different segments of society. 
Moreover, differences in employment patterns for individuals from different socio-economic groups
will influence their access to employer-provided private health insurance.
6
4.1 Public v. Private Healthcare and Brazilian Socio-Demographic Groups
Certain groups, delineated by race, education, and location in Brazil, are expected to be
systematically more reliant on the public healthcare system.  The question of which groups fall into
this category is determined with a simple Probit regression (Greene, 2000) of the following form:
) _ X (   =   1)   =   y P( j i, i β Φ (4.1.1)
where
yi  = form of healthcare coverage for individual i (1 = private, 0 = public)
Xi = socio-economic attributes of individual i; these include
- Race (Black, Asian, Mixed, White)
- Age
- Education is defined by years of schooling
- Household Income
- Regional Indicators:
- Percentage of Persons in the Household with less than fourteen y ears of age
- Percentage of People above 60 years of Age
                                                
6 This difficult issue (i.e., health insurance as an attribute of a job for which an individual may or may not face a
corresponding reduction in pay) is avoided by considering only those individuals who either buy private insurance
directly (i.e., those who do not receive it through an employer) or use the SUS.15
- Household Income: the total sum of wage and other types of income of individuals living
in the household.
The results of this regression, which are found in Table 3, correspond to general perceptions
about Brazilian healthcare.  Those who tend to be more reliant on the public system are less
educated, female, come from the Black and Mixed racial groups and from the Northern and Center-
Western regions of Brazil, have lower incomes, and are elderly.  The presence of people above sixty
years of age in the household is highly significant, while the presence of people below fourteen years
of age does not make a difference in the household￿s health insurance decision.  Given the results
described in Table 1 regarding differences in the quality of healthcare across providers, this alone
could be considered evidence of exclusion of these groups.
Table 4 provides additional evidence along these lines.  Specifically, it presents the results
of a number of Probit regressions in which a dummy variable indicating that an individual has
suffered from a particular disease (e.g., depression, arthritis, cancer, diabetes, respiratory ailment,
hypertension, cardiac disease, tuberculosis, cirrhosis, tendonitis, and kidney disease) is regressed on
a set of individual attributes, including the form of healthcare provision (i.e., SUS vs. private) that
the individual uses.  The idea here is that an individual￿s health stock, which determines how likely
he is to suffer from any of these ailments, is, in part, determined by the effective quantity of
healthcare he consumes.  This is directly a function of its quality, as well as its (shadow) price.  An
individual who relies on the public system might, therefore, receive lower quality care, or less care
in general (if waiting times for treatment are longer), leading to a lower health stock and a higher
likelihood of disease because the quality of public healthcare is low, and it is difficult to consume
effective healthcare units.  These results should be interpreted with extreme caution, however, as the
form of healthcare provision may be simultaneously determined with the individual￿s health stock;
e.g., an individual who knows he is likely to develop cancer might purchase private health insurance
in order to guarantee himself a higher quality of care.  The presence of an endogenous variable in
a Probit regression can potentially lead to inconsistent estimates of all the model￿s parameters.
The results, however, are very much consistent with a priori expectations about health and
about the Brazilian health system.  Women, generally, are less likely to suffer from almost all
diseases but cirrhosis; i.e., women seem to be healthier than men.  Higher income follows good16
health, meaning that poor people are more likely to suffer from some of the illnesses defined in the
PNAD survey. One important point to note, however, is that people with private health plans, either
self paid or employer paid, are more likely to suffer from some of the illnesses, while healthier
people are less likely to go to a private paid health plan.  This might simply be the result of getting
better diagnoses from a private healthcare provider than from a public clinic.  Certain illnesses seem
more likely to strike the Northeastern region, while people from the Southern and Southeastern 
regions are more likely to report cardiac disease, cancer, depression  and respiratory diseases.
4.2 A Model of Individual Healthcare Choice
While describing which elements of Brazilian society are more likely to rely on publicly provided
healthcare, the preceding analysis does not provide any way of measuring the welfare consequences
of this indirect form of exclusion.  In order to do so, it is necessary to develop a more elaborate
model that takes into account the fact that individuals optimally choose what form of health
insurance to obtain in the face of market prices and a budget constraint.  The second part of the
empirical analysis develops such a model.  The binding constraints on the scope of the conclusions
that can be taken away from this model come from the lack of data describing individuals￿ full
income endowments and actual expenditure patterns on health and non-health commodities.  Instead,
the model takes a stylized view, describing the individual￿s choice of health coverage as a choice
between alternative types of insurance in a static context.  To the extent that individuals change
health insurance status during the course of their life, this may bias answers.
In particular, it is assumed that individual i chooses his form of healthcare provision in order
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subject to a simple budget constraint:
i i
H
i i H P C 1 = + (4.2.2.)
Ci represents i￿s consumption of a composite numeraire commodity, Hi represents the
consumption of effective healthcare services (the price for these services, Pi
H is allowed to differ by
individual, and to reflect the quality of the nominal healthcare consumed), and Ii represents the
individual￿s income.  Pi
H will also differ according to the form of healthcare provision chosen; i.e.,17
Pi
S for SUS healthcare and Pi
P for privately provided healthcare.  The chief source of difficulty in
this analysis is that Pi
S is not observed (all SUS healthcare is nominally free), but is rather only a
shadow price of SUS healthcare consumption.
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which differs by whether the individual chooses SUS healthcare (V(Pi
S,Ii)) or private healthcare
(V(Pi
P,Ii)).  Taking the optimal allocation of income between composite consumption and healthcare
as given, individual i￿s choice between the two forms of healthcare provision can be modeled as a
comparison of these two indirect utility functions.  In particular, individual i will choose SUS
healthcare as long as:
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Because of the simple functional forms adopted for the present purpose, condition (4.2.4)
boils down to Pi
S  Pi
P.  The price of an effective unit of public healthcare is not an observed
magnitude; nominally, public healthcare is free to everyone in Brazil.  It has a price, however, in the
form of time in and disutility of crowded waiting rooms and other factors (see discussion in Section
2). This price would be expected to differ across individuals according to their opportunity cost of
time, preferences for cleanliness and quality, and disutility of congestion; i.e., differences for which
control may be possible with a set of observable individual attributes (Xi).
The available data make it possible to recover each individual￿s shadow price for an effective
unit of public healthcare by using inequality (4.2.4).  Once this is done, all the tools necessary are
available for considering the welfare impacts of an increase in the congestion costs associated with
receiving health services from the SUS.  In particular, assuming that the individual chooses the
healthcare option that maximizes his indirect utility (with the individual￿s perception of the quality




4.3 Estimation of the “Shadow” Price of Public Health Service
Pi
P is observed in available data.  Pi
S, on the other hand, is not observed and has to be estimated. In
particular, in PNAD data the price is observed of the private health insurance paid for everyone who
opted for that form of coverage. Private health insurance premiums are imputed for the rest of the
sample using the Heckman selection model:
1 u Z P i
p
i + = γ (4.3.1)
where  i Z are dummy variables describing the characteristics of the health plan and γ  is a vector of
coefficients associated with the matrix of attributes.
Pi
P is not observed for all households, but rather only for those who purchased private health
insurance.  It is not known, however, which households were more likely to purchase private health
plans, even if they had not actually acquired one.  The probability can be described by the Probit
regression in equation (4.1.1).  Equation (4.1.1) thus describes the sample selection component of
a Heckman Selection Model (Greene, 2000). Private health insurance premiums are imputed for the
whole sample by estimating equation (4.3.1), accounting for selection into private health provision
with a Heckman selection correction as specified in equation (4.1.1).  The results of this model are
presented in Table 5.  After estimating the parameters of equation (4.3.1) it is possible to forecast
the private premium for a standardized policy for all individuals.  In particular, the standardization
adopted sets all of the attributes of the healthcare policy to their simplest values￿i.e., to give the
price of a policy without any ￿bells or whistles.￿  This creates a level playing ground for comparison
of the individual￿s decision between public and private coverage (i.e., what would be the welfare
effect of an increase in the price of public healthcare if everyone had the same simple private option
to choose as an alternative).  Using this procedure, it is possible to estimate a shadow price, Pi
S,
which establishes how much each household would pay for the use of the public health system.
The natural logarithm of Pi
S is paramaterized as a linear function of individual attributes (Xi)
and an unobservable determinant (εi), which is assumed to be identically and independently normally
distributed with a variance σ
2 and a zero mean.  The choice of private health coverage is then
determined by the following condition being satisfied:
ε β i i
P
i   +   _ X   LE   P   ln     (4.3.2)19
which will be the case if:
ε β i i
P
i   LE   _ X   -   P   ln    (4.3.3)
which occurs with probability 1 - Φ[(ln Pi
P - Xiβ)/σ].  Similarly, the probability that individual i
chooses public health coverage is given by Φ[(ln Pi
P - Xiβ)/σ]. The likelihood of observing all of the
health coverage choices of the individuals in the data set (yi), given their observable attributes (Xi)
and private healthcare price (Pi
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This likelihood function is maximized over the parameter vector, β, using data describing the
decisions and attributes of a 10 percent subsample of household heads in the PNAD.  The use of only
household heads eliminates the correlation in insurance type between members of a household that
exists in the full data set, and the 10 percent subsample is chosen for computational tractability. 
Eliminating data with missing observations for some variables, this yields a sample size of N = 8267.
 Coefficient estimates and standard errors are reported in Table 6.  The parameter σ is not identified
in this discrete choice model; in particular, the parameters β are only identified up to a scaling
parameter introduced by σ. This regression is therefore performed for a range of plausible values for
the conditional standard deviation of ln Pi
S: 0.5, 1, 2, and 3; higher and lower values of the standard
deviation lead to numerical problems.  Results for each of these standard deviations are reported in
columns of Table 6.
Parameter estimates generally have the expected sign and tend to be statistically significant.
Those who would be expected to have greater disutility from factors such as congestion (i.e., from
having a greater opportunity cost of time) face a higher imputed price for SUS healthcare.  This is
true of older and more educated individuals, although once individuals are over the age of 60 (i.e.,
when they begin to retire), their imputed SUS healthcare price falls.  Individuals with higher incomes
face a higher price, also because of a greater opportunity cost of time, and urban individuals face a
greater cost than rural individuals, possibly because congestion problems are worse in cities.20
Individuals in the South, Southeast, and Center-West regions of Brazil face higher prices than those
in the North and Northeast, and Blacks and those in the Mixed racial category face lower prices than
Whites, while Asians face higher prices.  While the magnitudes of the various effects may differ, the
signs of each of these effects are consistent across possible values of σ.
As a measure of model fit, the predicted health coverage decisions of this model can be
compared with the decisions observed in the data.  The model does well, correctly predicting the
choices of 87 percent of all individuals irrespective of the assumed value of σ.  When the model fails
to predict correctly, it tends to be in the case of incorrectly forecasting the choices made by those
individuals who opt for private health coverage; i.e., high-income, more educated, and older
(younger than 60 years) individuals.
5. Results and Policy Analysis
5.1 Analyzing Welfare Effects of a Change in the Price of Public Healthcare
The initial goal of this study was to determine which groups would suffer the most as a result of the
increasing congestion of the public healthcare infrastructure that will likely accompany the socio-
demographic trends currently observed in Brazil.  In order to measure the welfare cost of increased
waiting time for public health provision, which might result from an increase in the number of
elderly Brazilians relying on the SUS without a corresponding increase in supply, it is necessary only
to consider the effect on different individuals in the sample if the price of public healthcare were to
increase (e.g., by 50%), taking into account the optimizing insurance decision each person makes
to this price increase.  Many individuals who had chosen public healthcare, for example, might stick
with that choice and bear the brunt of the price increase, while others might find it optimal to pay
more and switch to private healthcare.  Those who had chosen private health coverage prior to the
price increase would experience no change in price or disposable income. The decisions of each
individual in the data set are simulated, backing-out the overall change in the price of receiving
healthcare he or she faces after all is said and done under each of the possible values that σ might
take.  The last item considered is the difference in the natural logarithms of the prices ultimately
faced by each individual, before and after the price change.  This measure provides a proportional
measure of the compensating variation in income needed to maintain the same level of utility:21














    (5.1)
where Pi
H and Ii
 represent the price of healthcare provision and the accompanying required level of
income needed to reach the original level of utility, after the increase in the price of SUS health
coverage.  Note that the compensating variation in income cannot be calculated directly, because it
is not possible to determine αi for each individual.  This results from the fact that an individual￿s full
income endowment (i.e., an endowment including the value of available time, etc.) is not observed,
but only the individual￿s monetary income, which is not expended at all if SUS healthcare is
employed.  This means that it is impossible to ultimately determine whether the difference in log
prices is attributable to a compensating variation in income, or to heterogeneity in preferences.  For
the following discussion, the former is assumed.
In order to quickly summarize the welfare implications of an increase in the price of SUS
healthcare, like that which would accompany increasing congestion of that system, this proportional
measure is regressed on a vector of socio-demographic attributes in order to determine which groups
in Brazilian society will suffer the most.  The difference in magnitude of the effect across groups is
something that could not be determined from the simple Probit analysis described in Section 4.1,
because that analysis did not describe how different types of individuals￿ behaviors would change
in response to a price change.  In all, the model (assuming σ = 1) predicts that 6.6 percent of all
individuals consuming public healthcare prior to the price change would switch from public to
private health coverage in response to this simulated price increase.
7  Accounting for optimizing
responses is therefore important.
The results of this regression, performed separately for each potential value of σ, appear in
Table 7.  Those in the South (i.e., the excluded region) fare worse than those in the rest of Brazil,
especially the Center-West and Southeast.  Blacks and those in the Mixed racial group fare worse
than Whites, while Asians generally do better (owing to their greater predisposition to have been
using private healthcare before the price increase).  Older individuals do better (as they are also more
likely to have been using private healthcare in the first place), until they reach the age of 60, at which
point they generally rely more on public healthcare and do much worse.  Men generally fare worse
                                                
7 Note that this number falls dramatically as σ rises toward 3.22
than women, while those with more education and higher levels of income do better in the face of
rising SUS prices, again reflecting predispositions towards using private health coverage. The
directions of these effects are consistent across possible values of σ.
5.2 Analyzing the Welfare Effects of a Private Healthcare Subsidy
The apparatus developed above also makes it possible to consider the implications of counterfactual
policies designed to offset increasing congestion in the provision of public healthcare, where a
simple reduced-form analysis, like that described at the start of Section 4.1, cannot.  In particular,
the implication can be considered for individuals￿ optimizing choices of a private healthcare subsidy,
designed to expand the individual￿s budget constraint only if the income is used for the purchase of
private healthcare. The welfare implications of such a policy could then (with better data describing
the full income endowment) be compared to the implications of a simple income subsidy that could
be used for any sort of consumption, indicating the value of a relatively paternalistic policy.  In the
absence of such data, the welfare consequences of a simple 50% price subsidization of private
healthcare (i.e., the government pays 50 cents on every 1 real spent by the individual on private
healthcare) are considered. In order to describe how the resulting welfare gains (again, a proportional
measure of the compensating variation in income, assuming homogenous preferences, after the
optimizing provider of healthcare is chosen
8) differ across socio-demographic groups, these gains
are regressed on a vector of socio-demographic attributes.  The results of this regression are
described in Table 8 for each of the four values of σ considered.  The directions of each of the
marginal effects are consistent across alternative values of σ.  Negative numbers describe reductions
in income that return individuals to their original levels of utility (i.e., indicating a benefit). 
Individuals in the Center-West and Southeast regions seem to benefit most from this price subsidy,
while those in the North and Northeast benefit the least.  Whites and Asians benefit more than
Blacks and those in the Mixed racial group, and those with higher levels of education benefit more
than those with less.  Similarly, richer and older individuals (under the age of 60) benefit more from
                                                
8 The model (assuming σ = 1) predicts that approximately 13.3% of all individuals consuming public healthcare prior
to the price subsidy would switch to private health coverage.  With such a large increase in the demand for private
healthcare, the government might want to undertake policies to facilitate entry by new private healthcare providers in
addition to the subsidy, so as to avoid new congestion costs.23
the subsidy. Generally, these relative benefits reflect a greater predisposition towards (or propensity
to switch to) private healthcare provision.
The natural question is how might such a private healthcare subsidization policy be targeted
to benefit those individuals who would suffer most under an increase in the price of public care.  To
the extent that such subsidies, when applied broadly, seem to benefit high-income, high-education
individuals in the more developed parts of Brazil, they simply represent a transfer of rents, since
those individuals suffer less than the poor from the increasing price of public healthcare. One
possible alternative would be to implement the subsidy as part of an income tax collection regime,
where participation criteria could easily be established so as to make the subsidy available only to
low income residents.  Problems of fraud in the reporting of private healthcare expenditures,
however, might make this approach difficult.  Instead, it might be preferable to focus on the results
of the first counterfactual simulation, and target subsidy funds geographically so as to reach those
individuals who lose most under the simulated increases in public prices.  Such is true, for example,
of Black and Mixed race residents,
9 particularly those with low levels of education and in rural areas.
 One possible solution that would certainly benefit the most disadvantaged groups would be to target
subsidy funds toward lowering the cost of private healthcare in rural areas, possibly by establishing
new healthcare facilities in areas where none were previously present.  It is important to remember
as well the relatively large magnitude of the negative effect on members of the Black and Mixed
racial groups of increasing public healthcare prices, even in urban areas.
Finally, dealing with the impacts of rising public healthcare costs on the elderly (a major
concern given current socio-demographic trends) by subsidizing the consumption of private
healthcare seems especially futile, since those over the age of 60 are predicted to benefit less than
most other groups from this policy.  This arises from the model￿s prediction that members of this
group are not as likely to switch to private health coverage even with the change in relative prices.
Indeed, in order to limit the adverse effects on this group of rising congestion in public healthcare
consumption without affecting huge rent transfers to those who are less adversely impacted, the
                                                
9 Reaching these particular racial groups might be difficult, unless the subsidies took the form of monies to establish new
private healthcare facilities in racially segregated neighborhoods. 24
government will likely have to take steps to directly increase the supply of public healthcare
provision.
6. Conclusions and Extensions
The goal of this analysis was to determine which groups in Brazilian society were most ￿excluded￿
from private healthcare.  Private healthcare is generally considered to be of a higher quality than its
public counterpart; this perception is generally supported by the PNAD survey data.  Such exclusion
is not of a direct form as would be racial exclusion from a club, but is rather based on individuals
facing different relative prices for public and private healthcare owing to differences in their
observable attributes and preferences for healthcare consumption.  The initial analysis of PNAD
survey data documents what is generally perceived to be the case￿that poor, rural, Black and
Mixed-race Brazilians tend to rely more on public healthcare.  This alone would not necessarily
represent a source of social inequity, except that the price of this form of healthcare is expected to
increase in the coming decades owing to the increasing congestion of an already-overburdened
system, and these groups are expected to suffer disproportionately because of their inability to switch
to private health coverage. In order to determine how these price increases would be distributed over
different socio-economic groups, a more elaborate model of optimal individual decision-making is
needed; i.e., a model that makes it possible to determine how individuals would behave under current
and counterfactual relative-price scenarios.  Operating under constraints of data availability, it is
assumed that each individual was required to consume a single unit of some form of healthcare
coverage (i.e., public or private), and that differences in the quality of care across forms would be
internalized in the price confronting the individual.  Differences in price might also arise from
observable individual attributes (i.e., a direct form of discrimination), or from an individual￿s
preferences for healthcare consumption (e.g., individuals with strong preferences for healthcare
consumption might face an even higher price for an effective unit of public care than a similar
individual who had weak preferences for healthcare consumption), but available data do not make
it possible to identify these effects.  From a simple and stylized model of utility maximization, it was
possible to recover estimates of the price of public health coverage, and use those estimates to infer
which socio-demographic groups would suffer most from an increase in the congestion of the public
healthcare system.  The conclusions of this analysis conform to the general perceptions regarding25
race, education, and income groups, and suggest that rural individuals are more at risk than those
living in metropolitan areas.  Moreover, they suggest that using private healthcare subsidies as a
solution to increased congestion of the SUS will chiefly result in rent transfers to the least affected
groups. This result is significant in light of the Brazilian government￿s propensity toward
privatization of the provision of public healthcare in response to similar problems over the last ten
years.  Instead, it is clear that the SUS system itself must be expanded to meet the growing demand.
With even more detailed data on the attributes of the alternative forms of healthcare
provision (e.g., quality), it might also be possible to build a more realistic hedonic model in which
individuals with weak preferences for healthcare would choose to consume the type that exhibits low
levels of amenities and a low price, while those who derive a great deal of utility from the
consumption of healthcare might choose a ￿deluxe￿ form of healthcare provision.  This could be
important in predicting how different individuals would respond to an increase in the congestion of
the public system, which would increase waiting times for treatment (i.e., a specific trait of the
healthcare commodity). For example, certain socio-demographic groups might exhibit a strong
distaste for waiting time, and they would thus tend to bear more of the burden of increasing
congestion of the SUS.  Other survey data (e.g., the 1997 PPV) provide some indication of waiting
time incurred in the receipt of healthcare services, but these data exhibit many missing observations,
and it is unclear whether they will be appropriate for such an analysis.
Even with the limitations and simplifications described above, the current model is
suggestive of which groups are most likely to suffer from the increasing congestion of the public
healthcare infrastructure that is likely to accompany current demographic trends in Brazil.  From an
equity perspective, these groups are generally those about whom the greatest concern exists,
suggesting that some policy (i.e., subsidization of private healthcare or the expansion of the public
infrastructure) must be undertaken.  The results of the counterfactual simulations suggest that the
latter would be a more cost-effective vehicle for delivering the healthcare assistance to the groups
who need it most.26
Table 1. Perceptions of Healthcare Quality by Type of Coverage
Reason for failing to receive healthcare (for those seeking

























0 93.6 31.1 53.3 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4
North
1 97.7 0 50 0 0 25 25
0 93.8 39.5 29.7 10.3 4.9 5.4 10.3
NE
1 98.2 15.4 7.7 15.4 0 7.7 53.9
0 94.1 50 22.1 8.8 1.5 7.4 10.3
CW
1 96.8 50 40 10 0 0 0
0 95.4 43.1 28.8 13.1 5 3.8 6.3
SE
1 98.8 52.9 23.5 0 0 0 23.5
0 94.7 61.6 17.2 3 0 4 7.1
South
1 99.1 33.3 16.7 16.7 0 0 33.3
0 94.6 45.6 28.5 9.3 3.6 4.9 8
All
1 98.5 36 24 8 0 4 2827
Table 2. Data Summary, Household Heads
(N = 98,166)
Variable Mean Variable Mean
Sex 0.727 Age 44.524
Educ 6.612 Age60 0.176
Income 338.591 f_kind2 0.284
Black 0.068 PrivHP 0.069
White 0.526 whopay 0.101
Mixed 0.400 Arthrit 0.148
Yellow 0.004 Cancer 0.004
Urban 0.831 Cardiac 0.074
Metro 0.413 Cirrhose 0.003
dcwest 0.109 Backache 0.312
dseast 0.342 Depress 0.078
dsouth 0.178 Diabets 0.037
dnorth 0.068 Hipert 0.197
dneast 0.302 Kidney 0.047
With_HP 0.170 Respir 0.042
Migrator 0.009 Tendon 0.032
Value 79.474 Tuberc 0.002
Attend 0.131 Healthy 0.491
Characteristics of Private Health Plan (N=6639)
plcons 0.980 plexam 0.956
pllist 0.925 plinter 0.929
plreemb 0.310 platend 0.805
plother 0.811 plmedic 0.045
pldent 0.219 odonto 0.031
paymore 0.17828
Table 3. Probit Regression PrivHP
N = 82900, Log Likelihood = -16753.661
Variable Estimate Standard Error Variable Estimate Standard Error
Male 0.0051 0.0173 Southeast 0.3056 0.0345
Education 0.1173 0.0020 Northeast 0.0823 0.0356
Income 0.0003 0.00001 South 0.0411 0.0374
Black -0.4785 0.0855 Age 0.0233 0.0008
White -0.1862 0.0785 Age60 -0.2696 0.0290
Mixed -0.4284 0.0799 Child_14 -0.0195 0.0206
Center-West -0.0668 0.0409 Constant -3.3594 0.096429
Table 4. Probit Regressions, Determinants of Diseases
         Diseases
Variable









































































































































































N 95565 95565 95565 95565 95565 95565
Log
Likelihood
-32729.57 -2274.64 -21995.40 -1875.49 -55542.89 -24502.90
1- Z- statistics are in parentheses,   * significance level for 1%,     ** significance level for 5%30










































































































































































































N 95565 95565 95565 95565 95565 95565 95565
Log
Likelihoo
-13340.13 -40920.07 -17382.01 -16213.18 -12853.73 -1107.16 -58161.94
1- Z- statistics are in parentheses,   * significance level for 1%,     ** significance level for 5%31
Table 5. Heckman Procedure to Impute the Price of Private Health Services
N= 82800, Log Likelihood = -27520.82
Variable Estimate Standard Error Variable Estimate Standard Error
Male 0.1914 0.0244 pllist 0.0280 0.0386
Education -0.0382 0.0492 plreemb 0.1252 0.0216
Income 0.00001 0.00001 plother 0.2927 0.0268
Black -0.0087 0.0557 plcons -0.7845 0.0625
White -0.1418 0.0276 plexam 0.1088 0.0559
Asian 0.1438 0.9555 plinter 0.5942 0.0413
Center-West -0.1110 0.0564 pldent -0.3128 0.0235
Southeast -0.2026 0.0484 plmedic 0.0395 0.0440
Northeast -0.0128 0.0492 odonto -0.0045 0.0564
South -0.1704 0.0514 paymore -0.3670 0.0257
Age -0.0001 0.0013 depen 0.1983 0.0627
Age60 0.1520 0.0391 fam_dep 0.1447 0.0620
Child_14 0.0492 0.0278 platend -0.0104 0.0243
Constant 6.6104 0.1695
Selection Equation
Male -0.0098 0.0163 Southeast 0.2822 0.0319
Education 0.1161 0.0018 Northeast 0.0626 0.0328
Income 0.0003 0.00001 South 0.0653 0.0345
Black -0.0654 0.0350 Age 0.0215 0.0008
White 0.2188 0.0174 Age60 -0.1998 0.0274
Asian 0.4010 0.0769 Child_14 0.0790 0.0199
Center-West -0.0710 0.0377 Constant -3.5883 0.049432
Table 6. Determinants of ln Pi
S
(N = 8,267)
Analysis of Estimate Sensitivity to Assumed Value of σ
σ = 0.5 σ = 1 σ = 2 σ = 3
Variable
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Constant 4.7355 88.009 3.5521 29.979 1.1756 4.751 -1.2034 -3.199
Education .03127 15.562 .08772 19.236 .20130 20.788 .31508 21.282
Employee -.13516 -6.311 -.25389 -5.253 -.49186 -4.811 -.73000 -4.678
Self-Employed -.16128 -7.432 -.29376 -6.032 -.56029 -5.452 -.82723 -5.277
Domestic Worker -.27520 -5.137 -.53145 -4.622 -1.0444 -4.407 -1.5574 -4.332
Family Size -.02573 -3.961 -.04506 -3.147 -.08387 -2.802 -.12272 -2.696
Male -.02050 -1.020 -.14301 -3.200 -.38863 -4.140 -.63430 -4.435
Age .01781 19.854 .02704 13.754 .04561 11.138 .06421 10.322
Age > 60 -.01627 -.528 -.06543 -.952 -.16326 -1.130 -.26098 -1.185
Income Per Person .00015 44.930 .00023 28.825 .00040 22.482 .00058 20.600
Black -.31872 -8.112 -.48615 -5.704 -.82241 -4.651 -1.1591 -4.320
Mixed -.17262 -8.505 -.26142 -5.844 -.43949 -4.703 -.61775 -4.348
Asian .41099 4.092 .51005 2.096 .70864 1.320 .90733 1.091
Metro .12928 7.682 .24534 6.507 .47933 6.036 .71375 5.896
Child_14 -.02329 -1.033 -.04119 -.817 -.07710 -.727 -.11303 -.699
Center-West .15400 5.278 .23378 3.646 .39308 4.751 .55232 2.713
Northeast .12446 4.490 .03421 .553 .39308 2.936 -.32815 -1.655
Southeast .07870 3.627 .14061 2.868 .26577 2.559 .39135 2.467
North .07897 2.074 .04931 .5856 -.01069 -.060 -.07078 -.264
Log-Likelihood -3496.51 -2980.96 -2770.32 -2706.8133
Table 7. Socio-Demographic Effects on Proportional Measure of Compensating Income
Variation From a 50% Increase in Pi
S
(N = 8,267)
Analysis of Estimate Sensitivity to Assumed Value of σ
σ = 0.5 σ = 1 σ = 2 σ = 3
Variable
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Constant .50761 87.310 .50440 94.572 .49925 98.390 .49769 99.341
Education -.01482 -57.227 -.01084 -45.660 -.00910 -40.283 -.00844 -37.857
Employee .02847 10.956 .01503 6.304 .00782 3.448 .00665 2.972
Self-Employed .02839 10.924 .01577 6.615 .00999 4.405 .00877 3.914
Domestic Worker .04455 9.764 .01758 4.200 .00902 2.265 .00690 1.754
Family Size .00248 4.319 .00085 1.605 .00069 1.370 .00071 1.434
Male .02330 9.924 .016805 7.802 .01449 7.071 .01408 6.959
Age -.00223 -23.455 -.16133 -18.468 -.00135 -16.231 -.00130 -15.848
Age > 60 .01999 5.460 .01386 4.126 .00988 3.090 .00964 3.054
Income Per Person -.00003 -26.192 -.00004 -39.400 -.00004 -46.012 -.00004 -47.922
Black .03493 9.483 .01591 4.707 .00953 2.9626 .00813 2.560
Mixed .02110 10.182 .01007 5.296 .00657 3.6310 .00591 3.308
Asian -.05146 -2.872 -.06987 -4.251 -.08442 -5.397 -.09729 -6.300
Metro -.02115 -11.050 -.00978 -5.567 -.00597 -3.572 -.00577 -3.498
Child_14 -.00215 -.9265 -.00073 -.3447 -.00087 -.4269 -.00000 -1.095
Center-West -.01535 -4.425 -.01078 -3.387 -.00936 -3.092 -.00956 -3.197
Northeast -.00317 -1.105 -.00755 -2.872 -.00984 -3.934 -.01044 -4.228
Southeast -.01725 -6.469 -.01060 -4.332 -.00992 -4.264 -.01058 -4.601
North -.87364 -.2118 -.00085 -.2235 -.00312 -.8665 -.00463 -1.303
R
2 .561 .508 .497 .49334
Table 8. Socio-Demographic Effects on Proportional Measure of
Compensating Income Variation From a 50% Reduction in Pi
P
N = 8,267
Analysis of Estimate Sensitivity to Assumed Value of σ
σ = 0.5 σ = 1 σ = 2 σ = 3
Variable
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Constant .13868 16.174 .18410 20.486 .17196 19.657 .16534 19.164
Education -.03238 -84.801 -.02291 -57.254 -.01762 -45.238 -.01595 -41.506
Employee .06971 18.193 .03836 9.551 .01943 4.971 .01444 3.746
Self-Employed .07370 19.231 .03905 9.722 .02208 5.647 .01834 4.755
Domestic Worker .14139 21.013 .05355 7.593 .02206 3.213 .01577 2.329
Family Size .00664 7.847 .00310 3.496 .00131 1.520 .00135 1.588
Male .05934 17.137 .03629 10.000 .02683 7.595 .02404 6.899
Age -.00480 -34.164 -.00345 -23.448 -.00261 -18.204 -.00238 -16.819
Age > 60 .03380 6.259 .03111 5.497 .02172 3.943 .01834 3.375
Income Per Person -.00003 -18.538 -.00006 -36.940 -.00007 -44.557 -.00007 -46.916
Black .09321 17.157 .04312 7.573 .02180 3.933 .01729 3.162
Mixed .05404 17.683 .02645 8.259 .01495 4.794 .01191 3.873
Asian -.06196 -2.344 -.13335 -4.814 -.16781 -6.223 -.18145 -6.823
Metro -.05698 -20.181 -.02856 -9.652 -.01427 -4.952 -.01170 -4.119
Child_14 .00098 .287 -.00344 -.9583 -.00215 -.614 -.00272 -.787
Center-West -.03182 -6.217 -.02395 -4.466 -.01790 -3.427 -.01676 -3.254
Northeast .01186 2.808 -.01063 -2.400 -.01631 -3.781  -.01798  -4.228
Southeast -.04273 -10.865 -.02299 -5.577 -.01739 -4.334 -.01789 -4.521
North .00590 .971 -.00187 -.293 -.00399 -.642 -.00652 -1.065
R
2 .724 .587 .526 .51135
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